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Abstract—Secure message dissemination is an important issue
in vehicular networks, especially considering the vulnerability
of vehicle to vehicle (V2V) message dissemination to malicious
attacks. Traditional security mechanisms, largely based on mes-
sage encryption and key management, can only guarantee secure
message exchanges between known source and destination pairs.
In vehicular networks however, every vehicle may learn its
surrounding environment and contributes as a source, while in
the meantime act as a destination or a relay of information
from other vehicles, message exchanges often occur between
“stranger” vehicles. This makes secure message dissemination
against malicious tampering much more intricate. For secure
message dissemination in vehicular networks against insider
attackers, who may tamper the content of the disseminated
messages, ensuring the consistency and integrity of the transmit-
ted messages becomes a major concern that traditional message
encryption and key management based approaches fall short to
provide. However, it is challenging for a vehicle to distinguish
which message is true when its received messages from multiple
nearby vehicles are conflicting. In this paper, by incorporating
the underlying network topology information, we propose an
optimal decision algorithm that is able to maximize the chance
of making a correct decision on the message content, assuming
the prior knowledge of the percentage of malicious vehicles in
the network. Furthermore, a novel heuristic decision algorithm
is proposed that can make decisions without the aforementioned
knowledge of the percentage of malicious vehicles. Simulations
are conducted to compare the security performance achieved
by our proposed decision algorithms with that achieved by
existing ones that do not consider or only partially consider
the topological information, to verify the effectiveness of the
algorithms. Our results show that by incorporating the network
topology information, the security performance can be much
improved. This work shed light on the optimum algorithm design
for secure message dissemination.
Index Terms—Vehicular networks, security, message dissemi-
nation, decision algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular networks, with the assistance of dedicated short-
range communication (DSRC) [1] and LTE technology, enable
safety and non-safety information sharing among vehicles and
infrastructure through vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and vehicle
to infrastructure (V2I) communications, and therefore are
conductive to improving road safety, enhance traffic effi-
ciency and increase comfort and convenience to drivers and
passengers [2]–[4]. On the other hand, accompanying these
benefits brought along by vehicular network applications is
the urgent security issue that should be addressed. Specifi-
cally, considering the vulnerability of V2V communications,
message dissemination in vehicular networks is susceptible to
malicious attacks, e.g., malicious vehicles who may spread
false messages, tamper or drop the received messages [5]
to disrupt delivery of authentic messages. These attacks in
vehicular networks could potentially result in catastrophic
consequences like city-wide traffic congestion, traffic crash,
even loss of lives, and therefore are significant security threats
to transportation systems that must be thoroughly investigated
before vehicular networks can be deployed.
Vehicular network security design should guarantee authen-
tication, non-repudiation, information integrity, and in some
specific application scenarios, confidentiality, to protect the
network against attackers [6]. Conventional security mecha-
nisms, largely based on message encryption and key man-
agement [7], [8], are effective to guarantee message integrity
against outsider attackers, however fall short of protecting the
integrity of disseminated messages when there exist insider
attackers who possess valid certificates that can pass the au-
thentication process conducted by the certification authorities
[9], [10].
To keep the network message dissemination secure against
insider attackers, the trustworthiness of each vehicle and the
integrity of their transmitted messages are of great importance.
Different from traditional security settings, in vehicular net-
works, information collection and dissemination are conducted
by distributed vehicles. Quite often, information may be gen-
erated by or received from a vehicle that has never been en-
countered before. Moreover, the associated vehicular network
topology is constantly changing considering that both V2V and
V2I connections may emerge opportunistically. These unique
characteristics may render the entity-based trust establishment
approach, conducted at each vehicle by monitoring their in-
stantaneous neighbours’ behavior, futile in vehicular networks
because it is challenging to maintain a stable reputation value
for an unknown and fast-moving vehicle. Furthermore, safety-
related vehicular network applications usually require vehicles
to respond quickly to the received messages [11]. In such
cases, determining the integrity of the disseminated messages
is of greater importance than the malicious vehicle detection.
Therefore, decision algorithms based on data consistency and
integrity check emerge, e.g., [12]–[16]. However, when a
vehicle receives conflicting messages from different nearby
vehicles, it is not straightforward to assess which message is
true if focusing on data only while ignoring the underlying
network topology information that tells where these messages
come from. Indeed, messages coming from different paths can
be correlated when the these paths share some common nodes.
For instance, multiple false messages may result from the same
malicious vehicle shared by multiple paths. Therefore, taking
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2the underlying topological information into consideration is
essential and beneficial when designing decision algorithms
for vehicles to conduct data consistency check.
In this paper, we consider vehicular networks containing
insider malicious vehicles that may tamper the content of
messages to disrupt their successful delivery. We are interested
in investigating topology-based decision algorithms to keep
vehicles from being misguided by false messages. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work that takes
the underlying topology information into consideration when
checking the consistency of messages for secure message dis-
semination. Our results shed insight on the optimum decision
algorithm design for vehicular networks to improve security
performance.
The novelty and major contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows:
1) By utilizing the underlying network topology informa-
tion, we propose two message decision algorithms -
the optimum decision algorithm and a heuristic deci-
sion algorithm - to cope with the issue of message
inconsistency caused by insider malicious vehicles in
the network, so as to reduce their impact on the message
security performance.
2) The proposed optimum decision algorithm is able to
effectively help a vehicle maximally make a correct deci-
sion on the content of the message, given the topology
information and a prior knowledge of the percentage
of malicious vehicles in the network. The proposed
heuristic decision algorithm enables a vehicle to make
a decision when receiving conflicting messages purely
based on topology information, without the need for
knowing the percentage of malicious vehicles which can
be difficult to estimate in some circumstances.
3) Simulation results show that both our proposed algo-
rithms outperform existing decision algorithms that do
not consider or only partially consider the topological
information in terms of secure message dissemination
in vehicular networks. Besides, the proposed heuristic
decision algorithm, which is fairly easy to implement
in practice, is sufficient to achieve a high security
performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
reviews related work. Section III introduces the system model
and the problem formation. The optimum decision algorithm
and the heuristic decision algorithm are presented in Section
IV and Section V respectively. In Section VI, we conduct sim-
ulations to validate the effectiveness of our proposed decision
algorithms and discuss their insight. Section VII concludes this
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
For secure message dissemination in vehicular networks
against insider malicious vehicles, the trustworthiness of each
vehicle and the integrity of each transmitted message are
two major factors need to be considered. Accordingly, three
misbehavior detection schemes are commonly adopted to
help prevent the disseminated messages from being tampered:
entity-centric misbehavior detection scheme, data-centric mis-
behavior detection scheme, and a combined use of both. In
the following, we will review works on these three schemes
separately.
Entity-centric misbehavior detection schemes are commonly
conducted at each vehicle by monitoring their instantaneous
neighbors’ behavior to assess their trustworthiness level, so as
to filter out malicious vehicles. In [17], Gazdar et al. proposed
a dynamic and distributed trust model based on the use of a
Markov chain to evaluate the evolution of each vehicle’s trust
value. In [18], Ahmed et al. proposed a trust framework to
identify malicious nodes in the network by evaluating the trust
value of each vehicle, and the trust includes node trust and
recommendation trust. In [19], motivated by the job market
signaling model, Haddadou et al. proposed a distributed trust
model for vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) that is able
to gradually detect all malicious nodes as well as boosting
the cooperation of selfish nodes. In [20], Sedjelmaci et al.
proposed a lightweight intrusion detection framework with the
help of a clustering algorithm to overcome the challenges of
intermittent and ad hoc monitoring and assessment processes
caused by the high mobility and rapid topology change in
vehicular networks.
Data-centric misbehavior detection schemes focus on the
consistency check of the disseminated data to filter out false
data. In [12], Dietzel et al. indicated that redundant data
forwarding paths are the most promising technique for ef-
fective data consistency check in a multi-hop information
dissemination environment, and proposed three graph-theoretic
metrics to measure the redundancy of dissemination protocols.
In [13], Raya et al. proposed a framework for vehicular
networks to establish data-centric trust, and evaluated the
effectiveness of four data fusion rules. In [14], Huang et al.
firstly demonstrated that information cascading and oversam-
pling adversely affect the performance of trust management
scheme in VANETs, and then proposed a novel voting scheme
that takes the distance between the transmitter and receiver into
account when assigning weight to the trust level of the received
data. In [15], Zaidi et al. proposed a rogue node detection
system for VANETs utilizing statistical inference techniques
to determine whether the received data are authentic. In [16],
Radak et al. applied a so-called cautious operator to deal with
data received from different sources to detect dangerous events
on the road. Their adopted cautious operator is an extension
of the Demper-Shafer theory that is known to be superior in
handling data coming from dependent sources.
A combined misbehavior detection scheme makes use of
both the trust level of vehicles and the consistency of received
data to detect misbehaving vehicles and filter out incorrect
messages. Works adopting the combined scheme are limited.
In [21], Dhurandher et al. proposed a security algorithm
using both node reputation and data plausibility checks to
protect the network against attacks. The node reputation value
is obtained by both direct monitoring and indirect recom-
mendation from neighbors, to detect misbehaving vehicles;
and the data consistency check is conducted by comparing
the received data with the sensed data by the vehicle’s own
sensors. In [22], Li et al. proposed an attack-resistant trust
3management scheme to evaluate the trustworthiness of both
data and vehicles in VANETs. They adopted the Dempster-
Shafer theory to combine the data received from different
sources, and then used this combined result to update the trust
value of vehicles for misbehavior detection.
In summary, all the aforementioned works on protecting
vehicular networks from insider attackers either focused on
node trust model establishment and management to detect
misbehaving nodes in the network, or focused on methods
to assess data from different sources to check their consis-
tency, but did not take the underlying network topological
information into consideration. Our work distinguishes from
theirs in that we focus on the received data itself, and utilize
the underlying network topology information to design the
decision algorithms for vehicles to check data consistency so
as to maximally protect the authenticity of the disseminated
messages.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMATION
In this section, we first introduce the system model, in-
cluding the network model, message dissemination model, and
the attack model. Then, we give a rigorous description of the
research problem addressed in this paper.
A. Network and Message Dissemination Model
We consider a vehicular network where each vehicle has a
unique ID number that is registered in certification authority
to represent its identity, and vehicles cannot forge their own
or other vehicles’ ID numbers.
Specifically, consider that there is a vehicle in the network
(termed as the source vehicle) intending to deliver a message
about the road condition to inform other vehicles further away.
The road condition information can be abnormal situations,
e.g., hazardous road conditions such as traffic accident, slip-
pery road, etc., or normal situation, e.g., uncongested traffic.
We assume that the content of message takes value from
{0, 1}, and 1 represents abnormal road condition and 0 repre-
sents normal road condition. It is worth noting that the road
situation can also be described as a multi-variable vector and
these variables can be correlated [13], e.g., one such variable
can be traffic congestion state and another can be accident
state. We denote the content of message transmitted by the
source vehicle, which represents the actual road condition, by
m0, m0 ∈ {0, 1}. Other vehicles do not know the true value
of m0 a priori.
The message is forwarded from the source vehicle in a
broadcast and multi-hop [23], [24] manner to other vehicles
with the help of relay vehicles. Relay vehicles can be any vehi-
cle along the message propagation path. Multi-path forwarding
makes it challenging for the attackers to influence all message
forwarding paths [12], therefore helps to improve the message
security performance of the network. When a vehicle transmits
a message to other vehicles, it adds its identity information,
i.e., ID number, to the message. This is commonly adopted in
vehicular network applications and can be achieved by some
standard signature approach [2], [25]. Using this, any vehicle
in the network is able to obtain an integrity-protected path list
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Fig. 1. An illustration of a vehicular network when there exists a malicious
vehicles V2 who would tamper the content of message. Specifically, S is the
source vehicle, D is the destination vehicle, and vehicles between them are
relay vehicles. There are four paths (S−V1−V4−V8−D, S−V2−V5−
V8−D, S−V2−V6−V9−D, and S−V3−V7−V9−D) that deliver the
source message from S to D. Therefore, out of the four copies of messages
received by D, two copies are incorrect as there are two paths containing the
malicious vehicle V2.
of its received messages recording the relay vehicles of each
message, and the records cannot be injected and removed by
attackers.
B. Attack Model
We consider insider attackers in this paper. That is, we
assume all vehicles are legitimate vehicles that have passed the
authentication process conducted by the certification authority
[13], [15]. Vehicles in the network can be classified into
two categories: normal vehicles, which behave normally and
will forward the received message without any alteration, and
malicious vehicles, which may tamper the received message.
Malicious vehicles are uniformly distributed in the system with
proportion p. It follows that the probability of each vehicle
being a malicious vehicle is p, independent of the event that
another distinct vehicle is a malicious vehicle.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the source vehicle
is normal and only relay vehicles may be malicious. The
normal vehicles do not know which vehicles are normal or
malicious. On the other hand, malicious vehicles not only
know which vehicles are malicious, but also are capable of
communicating with each other via back channels of infinite
bandwidth [26]. That is, we assume that malicious vehicles
know what the correct message transmitted by the source
vehicle is. As a consequence, each malicious vehicle simply
transmit the incorrect message, i.e., different from message
m0, to its neighbors. This implies that as long as a message
is relayed by at least one malicious vehicle, the message
would be incorrect. Fig. 1 gives a simple example of message
dissemination process when there are insider attackers in the
network.
C. Problem Formation
Now we give a detailed description of the research problem
considered in this paper.
We consider that there is a vehicle, which is several hops
away from the source vehicle, trying to make a decision on the
message content when it receives several copies of message,
and we call it the destination vehicle. Note that the destination
vehicle can be any vehicle along the message dissemination
path. From the time instant the destination vehicle receives
4the first message, it waits time period T to receive more
messages before making a final decision. T characterizes the
response time requirement on the decision, and a larger T
potentially allows the vehicle to receive more messages. We
will discuss its impact on the integrity of the decision later
in the simulation. Let k be the number of message received
by a destination vehicle during its waiting time period T
and let n be the number of relay vehicles that participate in
relaying the k copies of message from the source vehicle to
the destination vehicle. In the following analysis, we regard
k and n are known to the destination vehicle, which can be
readily obtained from the received messages. Consequently,
the network being considered has n relay vehicles and k paths
between the source vehicle and the destination vehicle. Other
nodes who do not participate in the relay have little impact
and hence can be ignored.
Denote the k messages received by the destination vehicle
by Mi, i = 1, 2, ...k, Mi ∈ {0, 1}, and let the message vector
M = [M1 M2 ...Mk]
T . As each message corresponds to a
specific delivery path from the source vehicle to the destination
vehicle, we number the corresponding paths by L1, L2, ...Lk.
In addition, we number the relay vehicles by V1, V2, ...Vn. A
vehicle Vi may belong to one or more paths.
Note that due to the existence of malicious vehicles who
may tamper the content of the message, the k copies of
message received by the destination vehicle can be in conflict
instead of being consistent with each other. Furthermore,
with the potential existence of some shared relay vehicles
in different paths, the k messages received from k different
paths may not be independent. These correlations are all
contained in the information of message dissemination paths.
Therefore, we construct a topology matrix to represent the
underlying network topological correlation. Specifically, based
on the path information derived from the received messages,
the destination vehicle can readily construct a k×n topology
matrix B, where each row represents a path, each column a
node (vehicle), and the (i, j)-th entry Bij being an indicator
whether vehicle Vj belongs to path Li:
Bij =
{
1, if vehicle Vj belongs to path Li
0, else
(1)
In this paper, we are interested in designing optimal decision
algorithms for the destination vehicle to maximize the chance
of a correct decision on the content of the disseminated
message against attacks from malicious vehicles by utilizing
the underlying network topology information. Denote by d,
d ∈ {0, 1} the final decision on the content of message made
by the destination vehicle. If the decision is the same as
the source message, i.e., if d = m0, we say the destination
vehicle makes a correct decision, otherwise we say it makes an
incorrect decision. We use the probability of correct decision,
denoted by Psucc, as the performance metric to measure the
secure message dissemination performance, and Psucc can be
formally defined as follows:
Psucc = Pr(d = 1,m0 = 1) + Pr(d = 0,m0 = 0) (2)
IV. OPTIMUM DECISION ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a decision algorithm aims to
optimize the secure message dissemination performance in
terms of maximizing the probability of correct decision Psucc,
that is,
max Psucc, (3)
where Psucc is given by (2).
In the following, we will first present the optimum decision
algorithm followed by a detailed proof to prove its optimality,
and then we will introduce its detailed implementation and
discuss its limitation in practical realization.
A. Optimum Decision Algorithm
The following theorem summarizes the optimum decision
algorithm to maximize Psucc.
Theorem 1. Consider that a destination vehicle receives k
copies of messages M1 = m1,M2 = m2, ...Mk = mk. Given
the prior knowledge of the probabilities that the occurrence
of abnormal event of interest, e.g., traffic congestion, are
P1 = Pr(m0 = 1), and P0 = 1 − P1 = Pr(m0 = 0), which
can be estimated from empirical knowledge [27], the optimum
decision algorithm that leads to (3) can be shown as follows:
d =
{
1, Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=1)Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=0) >
P0
P1
0, Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=1)Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=0) <
P0
P1
, (4)
and when Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=1)Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=0) =
P0
P1
, d is randomly
chosen from 0 and 1 with equal probability.
Proof: As introduced in [28], [29], the objective of a
binary Bayes decision problem is to minimize the expectation
of the decision cost, denoted by U(d,m0). Let Uij , i = 0, 1,
j = 0, 1, represents the cost of declaring the final result d = i
when actually the source message m0 = j 6= i, and Uij can be
negative to represent the benefits of making a correct decision.
As a ready consequence of the total probability theorem, the
expectation of the decision cost U(d,m0) can be expressed as
follows:
U(d,m0) =
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
UijPr (d = i, m0 = j) . (5)
When assuming U01 > U11 and U10 > U00, which is rea-
sonable considering the cost of making an incorrect decision is
usually larger than that making a correct decision, the optimum
decision algorithm that minimizes the expectation of the
decision cost made by the destination vehicle given its k copies
of received message M1 = m1,M2 = m2, ...Mk = mk, is
given by [29]:
d =
{
1 Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=1)Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=0) >
P0(U10−U00)
P1(U01−U11)
0, Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=1)Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=0) <
P0(U10−U00)
P1(U01−U11)
, (6)
where Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1) and
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0) are the two conditional
probabilities of the occurrence of event M1 = m1,M2 =
m2, ...Mk = mk, which characterize the correlations between
5received messages. Besides, when a tie occurs, namely, when
Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=1)
Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=0) =
P0(U10−U00)
P1(U01−U11) , d is randomly
chosen from 0 and 1 with equal probability.
From (5), when assuming the cost of making a correct
decision is 0 and making an incorrect decision is 1, namely,
by assuming U00 = U11 = 0 and U01 = U10 = 1, we have:
U(d,m0) = Pr (d = 0,m0 = 1) + Pr (d = 1,m0 = 0)
= 1− Psucc. (7)
It follows that a minimization of the expectation of the deci-
sion cost, is equivalent to a maximization of the probability
of correct decision, namely, we have
min U(d,m) ⇐⇒ max Psucc (8)
Therefore, the optimum decision algorithm for the optimiza-
tion problem (3) is exactly the decision algorithm that provides
a solution to the classical Bayes decision problem in a special
case, shown as (4), which finalize the proof.
Remark 2. It can be seen from (4) that, given the probabilities
of the occurrence of abnormal event of interest, P0 and P1
respectively, the decision on d = 1 or d = 0 depends on
the ratio Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=1)Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=0) . That is, given a set of
received messages M1 = m1,M2 = m2, ...Mk = mk, the
destination vehicle need to calculate the probability that the
event M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk occurs if the true message
m0 is 1, denoted as Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1), and
the probability that the event occurs if the true message
m0 is 0, denoted as Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0). A
decision on d is then made by comparing the value of
Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=1)
Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=0) and
P0
P1
. Therefore, calculation of
the two probabilities is the critical part of implementing the
algorithm in practice.
In summary, the optimum decision algorithm for
the destination vehicle to maximally make a correct
decision on the message content works as detailed
in Algorithm 1, where the details of calculating the
two terms Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1) and
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0) will be given in the
following subsection.
B. Algorithm Implementation
In this part, we will introduce the detailed implemen-
tation of the proposed optimum decision algorithm. As
discussed in Remark 2, the first step is to calculate
the two probabilities Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1) and
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0) as they are prerequisite
to obtaining the final decision d.
The main idea behind the calculation
of Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1) and
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0) is as follows. We
classify vehicles into three different types based on the paths
they belong to. We call a vehicle a Type 0 (or Type 1)
vehicle if it only belongs to paths that deliver messages with
content 0 (or 1) to the destination vehicle, and a vehicle is
a Type 2 vehicle (if any) if it belongs to at least one path
that delivers message with content 0 and another path that
Algorithm 1 Optimum decision algorithm
INPUT: M1,M2, ...Mk, P0, P1, p
OUTPUT: d
begin
1) Construct topology matrix B based on the paths infor-
mation derived from the received k copies of message;
2) Calculate Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1) and
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0) according to (12)
and (??) respectively, given the network topology
information and a prior knowledge on the proportion of
malicious vehicles in the network;
3) If Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=1)Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=0) >
P0
P1
then d = 1;
elseif Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=1)Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=0) <
P0
P1
then d = 0;
else then d is randomly chosen from 0 and 1
with equal probability;
end
end
delivers message with content 1 to the destination vehicle.
That is a Type 0 vehicle only belongs to paths that deliver
consistent messages 0; a Type 1 vehicle only belongs to
paths that deliver consistent messages 1; while a Type 2
vehicle belong to paths that delivers inconsistent messages.
Therefore, by separating the paths according to the delivered
message contents, the conclusion readily follows that given
m0 = 1, all the Type 1 and Type 2 vehicles are normal
vehicles, meanwhile malicious vehicles only exist among
Type 0 vehicles. Then, by listing and analyzing all the
different combination of malicious vehicles among the Type
0 vehicles, we can obtain the result of our target conditional
probability Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1). The idea of
calculating Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0) is totally the
same.
In the following, we will first demonstrate the
method of constructing topology matrix B based
on the above idea, and then calculate the two
probabilities Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1) and
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0) respectively. Without
loss of generality, we assume that among the k copies of
messages M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk received by the destination
vehicle, there are exactly k1, messages with content 1 and
the other k − k1 messages with content 0. Note that k1 = 0
and k1 = k are both trivial cases implying no conflict in the
received messages so that the decision is straightforward,
therefore we only consider the case when 0 < k1 < k.
1) Constructing the topology matrix B: Specifically, recall
the definition of the topology matrix given in (1), that each
row corresponds to a path and each column corresponds
to a vehicle. Based on the idea discussed above to cal-
culate the probabilities Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1)
and Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0), we re-arrange the
6network topology matrix B in the following form:
B =
[
B1 Bs1 0
0 Bs0 B0
]
, (9)
where B1, B0, Bs1 and Bs0 , if exist, are non-zero matrices,
and
[
B1 Bs1 0
]
is a k1 × n sub-matrix corresponding
to the paths that deliver messages with content 1 to the
destination vehicle, and
[
0 Bs0 B0
]
is a (k−k1)×n sub-
matrix corresponding to the paths that deliver messages with
content 0 to the destination vehicle. Besides, the columns of
B1 and B0 correspond to vehicles that only belong to paths
that deliver messages with content 1 and that deliver messages
with content 0 to the destination vehicle respectively, i.e., Type
1 vehicles and Type 0 vehicles respectively. The columns of
sub-matrix
[
Bs1
Bs0
]
correspond to all the Type 2 vehicles.
Assume that the number of Type 1 and Type 0 vehicles are
n1 and n0 respectively, 0 ≤ n1 + n0 ≤ n, and the number of
Type 2 vehicles is n2 = n− n1 − n0. It follows that matrices
B1 and B0 are of size k1×n1 and (k−k1)×n0 respectively,
and the matrix
[
Bs1
Bs0
]
is of size k × (n− n1 − n0).
It is worth noting that the above arrangement of columns
and rows of matrix B corresponds to a re-numbering of
vehicles and paths and it does not change the underlying
topology in terms of paths information. Besides, the sub-
matrix B1 can be non-existent if n1 = 0, i.e., when the paths
that deliver messages 0 to the destination vehicle contains all
the n vehicles in the network. Under this circumstance, B =[
Bs1 0
Bs0 B0
]
. Similarly, the sub-matrix B0 (or
[
Bs1
Bs0
]
) can
also be non-existent when n0 = 0 (or n2 = 0).
2) Calculation of Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1)
and Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0) : In this part,
we show the method of calculating the two conditional
probabilities Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1) and
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0) using the constructed
topology matrix B. The following two theorems summarize
the results.
Theorem 3. Consider that a destination vehicle receives k
copies of message M1 = m1,M2 = m2, ...Mk = mk, and
among which k1 messages are with content 1 and the other
k− k1 messages are with content 0, 0 < k1 < k. Conditioned
on the source message m0 = 1, the conditional probability
of the occurrence of event M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk can be
calculated as follows:
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1)
=
{
(1− p)n−n0 ·
[∑n0
i=1 ai · pi (1− p)n0−i
]
, n0 > 0
0, n0 = 0
,
(10)
where n0 is the number of vehicles that only belong to paths
that deliver messages with content 0 to the destination vehicle,
i.e., the number of Type 0 vehicles in the network, and ai, i =
1, 2, ...n0 is the number of combinations that contain exactly
i malicious Type 0 vehicles leading to the occurrence of event
M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk.
Proof: When n0 = 0, there are no Type 0 vehicles
in the network, which implies that the paths that deliver
messages with content 1 to the destination vehicle contain all
the n vehicles in the network, and the topology matrix B =[
B1 Bs1
0 Bs0
]
. Under this circumstance, conditioned on the
source message m0 = 1, when the event that k1 messages are
with content 1 occurs, all the n vehicles in the network should
be normal vehicles. It follows that the event that the other
k− k1 messages are with content 0 occurs with probability 0.
Therefore, we have Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1) = 0
when n0 = 0.
When n0 > 0, from the topology matrix B, we can conclude
that if the matrix
[
Bs1
Bs0
]
exists, then the corresponding Type
2 vehicles should be all normal vehicles. Observing that there
is no possibility for two paths sharing the same malicious
vehicle to deliver different contents. Therefore, malicious
vehicles exist either among Type 1 vehicles or among Type 0
vehicles.
Given the source message m0 = 1, all the Type 1 vehi-
cles should be normal vehicles. Malicious vehicles can only
exist among Type 0 vehicles. Besides, the malicious Type 0
vehicles should be able to compromise all the k − k1 paths
(corresponding to the sub-matrix
[
0 Bs0 B0
]
) to cause
the occurrence of the event that all the k−k1 paths delivering
messages with incorrect content 0. Therefore, any combination
of malicious vehicles should satisfy the follows condition:
by implementing element-wise union on their corresponding
columns in sub-matrix B0, i.e., implementing element-wise
Boolean operation OR on them, the result should be a column
with each entry be 1.
Note that the number of malicious type 0 vehicles can be
any integer within [1, n0]. We denote by event ei that randomly
choosing i columns from sub-matrix B0 and then conducting
element-wise union operation to them, there results a column
with each entry being 1. Denote by ai, i = 1, 2, ...n0 the total
number of combinations that event ei occurs. Therefore, we
have
ai =
zi∑
j=1
I (event ei occurs) , (11)
where zi =
(
n0
i
)
, and I(x) is an indicator function that
I(x) = 1, when x is true; otherwise I(x) = 0.
It then follows from the combination theory [30] that :
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1)
= (1− p)n−n0 ·
[
n0∑
i=1
ai · pi (1− p)n0−i
]
, (12)
where the first part corresponds to the probability that the
k1 paths deliver messages with correct content 1, so that all
the n− n0 vehicles contained in these k1 paths are therefore
normal vehicles; and the second part is the probability that the
k−k1 paths deliver messages with incorrect content 0, which
summing up all the probabilities of different malicious vehicle
combinations.
7Theorem 4. Consider that a destination vehicle receives k
copies of message M1 = m1,M2 = m2, ...Mk = mk, and
among which k1 messages are with content 1 and the other
k− k1 messages are with content 0, 0 < k1 < k. Conditioned
on the source message m0 = 0, the conditional probability
of the occurrence of event M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk can be
calculated as follows:
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0)
=
{
(1− p)n−n1 ·
[∑n1
i=1 bi · pi (1− p)n1−i
]
, n1 > 0
0, n1 = 0
,
(13)
where n1 is the number of vehicles that only belong to
paths that deliver messages with content 1 to the destination
vehicle, i.e., the number of Type 1 vehicles in the network, and
bi, i = 1, 2, ...n1 is the number of combinations that exactly i
malicious Type 1 vehicles leading to the occurrence of event
M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk.
Denote by event e
′
i that randomly choosing i columns
from sub-matrix B1 and then conducting element-wise union
operation to them, there results a column with each entry be 1.
Denote by bi, i = 1, 2, ...n1 the total number of combinations
that event e
′
i occurs. Then we have
bi =
z
′
i∑
j=1
I
(
event e
′
i occurs
)
, (14)
where z
′
i =
(
n1
i
)
. Therefore, this theorem can be readily
proved following the same method as that used in the proof
of Theorem 3, and hence is ignored.
C. Discussion
From the analysis in Section IV-B, we can see that the value
of n0, n1, and ai, i = 1, 2, ...n0 in (10), bi, i = 1, 2, ...n1 in
(13) can be obtained from the network topology matrix. That
is, when the k received messages M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk, and
the network topology is given, the value of n0, n1, ai, i =
1, 2, ...n0, and bi, i = 1, 2, ...n1 are all determined. However,
the exact values of Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1) and
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0), shown also in (10) and
(13), also depend on the proportion of malicious vehicles p
in the network, which usually, is not easy to be obtained or
estimated as a prior knowledge. In the following, we use a
simple example to show the dependency on p of the proposed
optimum decision algorithm.
Consider a network that contains a total of 7 independent
paths from the source vehicle to the destination vehicle. The
first three paths, containing 1, 8 and 15 vehicles respectively
deliver messages with content 1 to the destination vehicle,
and the other four paths, containing 6 vehicles each, deliver
messages with content 0 to the destination vehicle. See Fig. 2
for an illustration.
According to (10) and (13), we have:
Pr (M1 =M2 =M3 = 1,M4 = ... =M7 = 0|m0 = 1)
S 
Fig. 2. An illustration of a vehicular network that contains 7 independent
paths from the source vehicle to the destination vehicle, each path containing
1, 8, 15, 6, 6, 6, 6 vehicles respectively.
=(1− p)1+8+15 · [1− (1− p)6]4
=(1− p)24 · [1− (1− p)6]4 , (15)
and
Pr (M1 =M2 =M3 = 1,M4 = ... =M7 = 0|m0 = 0)
=(1− p)6×4 · [1− (1− p)] [1− (1− p)8] [1− (1− p)15]
=(1− p)24p [1− (1− p)8] [1− (1− p)15] . (16)
Therefore,
Pr (M1 =M2 =M3 = 1,M4 = ... =M7 = 0|m0 = 1)
Pr (M1 =M2 =M3 = 1,M4 = ... =M7 = 0|m0 = 0)
=
1− (1− p)6
p [1− (1− p)8] [1− (1− p)15] (17)
Let
f1(p) = 1− (1− p)6 (18)
and
f2(p) = p
[
1− (1− p)8] [1− (1− p)15] , (19)
and plot them with different values of p, see Fig. 3 for an illus-
tration. We can see that the value of Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=1)Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=0)
depends on the percentage of malicious vehicles in the net-
work. Specifically, it is shown in Fig. 3 that when p is
smaller than a threshold, e.g., pth = 0.092 in this case, the
value of Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=1)Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=0) =
f1(p)
f2(p)
is smaller than
1, while when p is larger than the threshold, the value of
Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=1)
Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=0) =
f1(p)
f2(p)
is larger than 1, and will
further increase with an increase of p. Therefore, given the
network topology, the optimum decision based on (4) relies
on the value of p. This illustrates that the value of p is
indispensable in adopting the optimum decision algorithm to
achieve an accurate decision result.
V. HEURISTIC DECISION ALGORITHM
As discussed in the Section IV-C, the implementation of the
optimum decision algorithm proposed in the last section relies
on prior knowledge of the percentage of malicious vehicles p
in the network, which is usually not easy to be obtained or
estimated. In this section, to eliminate the dependence on p,
we propose a heuristic decision algorithm for the destination
vehicle to make a decision when receiving conflicting mes-
sages purely based on network topology information only.
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Fig. 3. An illustration to show that the percentage of malicious vehicles is
indispensable in implementing the optimum decision algorithm to achieve an
accurate decision result.
The heuristic decision algorithm is derived from the prin-
ciple of Maximum Likelihood Estimation [31], which can be
described as follows:
d =
{
1, Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=1)Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=0) > 1
0, Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=1)Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=0) < 1
, (20)
where M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk are the k messages received
by the destination vehicle, m0 is the source message and
d is the decision made by the destination vehicle. When
Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=1)
Pr(M1=m1,...Mk=mk|m0=0) = 1, d is randomly chosen from
0 and 1 with equal probability.
Based on the received messages M1 = m1, M2 = m2, ...,
Mk = mk and the path information obtained from messages,
the method of constructing the topology matrix B is the same
as introduced in Section IV-B, i.e., B =
[
B1 Bs1 0
0 Bs0 B0
]
.
Therefore, by combining (10), (13) and (20), it is ready to
have d =
{
0, n0 = 0
1, n1 = 0
, and when n0 > 0 and n1 > 0,
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1)
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0)
=
(1− p)n−n0 ·
[∑n0
i=1 ai · pi (1− p)n0−i
]
(1− p)n−n1 ·
[∑n1
i=1 bi · pi (1− p)n1−i
]
=
∑n0
i=1 ai ·
(
p
1−p
)
i∑n1
i=1 bi ·
(
p
1−p
)
i
. (21)
Recall that both sub-matrix
[
B1 Bs1 0
]
and[
0 Bs0 B0
]
correspond to a sub-network of the
considered network and the common nodes shared by the
two sub-networks (if any) can not be malicious vehicles.
Therefore, when considering the potential malicious vehicle
combinations, we avoid these common nodes and only focus
on the sub-matrix B1 and B0. Specifically, we regard the
network corresponding to sub-matrix B1 and B0 as networks
that each row represents a complete path and each column
represent a vehicle, denoted by T1 and T0 respectively. In
the following, with a twist of the vertex-cut [32] terminology
from graph theory which defines a vertex set whose removal
V1 V4
V2
V3
V5
S DV6
V7
V8
V9
Fig. 4. An illustration to show the malicious cut sets and minimal malicious
cut sets of a network.
would disconnect the graph, we define malicious cut set, size
of a malicious cut set, and minimal malicious cut set of a
network in this paper, and demonstrate that the parameter ai,
1 ≤ i ≤ n0 and bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 in (21), which was defined in
(11) and (14), are exactly the number of malicious cut sets
with size i of the network T0 and T1 respectively.
Definition 5. A malicious cut set of a network is a combina-
tion of vehicles, where if all vehicles in the set are malicious
vehicles all paths of the network can be compromised. The
size of a malicious cut set is the number of vehicles contained
in the set. A minimal malicious cut set is a malicious cut set
with the smallest size.
It is worth noting that the network may have multiple
malicious cut sets and multiple minimal malicious cut sets.
Consider the network shown in Fig. 4 for an example. Vehicle
sets {V1, V2, V3}, {V4, V5, V6, V7}, and {V8, V9} (to name a
few) are all malicious cut sets of the network, and a minimal
malicious cut set is the malicious cut set {V8, V9} with size
2. Therefore, to compromise all paths of this network, the
minimum number of malicious vehicles needed is 2.
Based on Definition 5, if a vehicle set is a malicious cut
set, then each path of the network contains at least one vehicle
belongs to this set. Recall that ai (or bi) represents the number
of combinations that randomly choosing i columns from sub-
matrix B0 (B1) and then conducting element-wise union to
them, there results a column with each entry be 1. That is, ai
(or bi) represents the number of combinations that by choosing
i vehicles from Network T0 (or T1) to form a vehicle set,
each path of network T0 (or T1) contains at least one vehicle
belongs to this set. Therefore, ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n0 and bi, 1 ≤ i ≤
n1 are exactly the number of malicious cut sets with size i of
the network T0 and T1 respectively.
According to the properties of malicious cut sets, it can be
readily obtained that ai = 0 if ai+1 = 0, and ai+1 > 0, if
ai > 0. Similarly, we have bi = 0 if bi+1 = 0, and bi+1 > 0,
if bi > 0.
Define
r0 = min {i : ai > 0} , 1 ≤ r0 ≤ n0 (22)
and
r1 = min {i : bi > 0} , 1 ≤ r1 ≤ n1, (23)
the smallest integer that satisfies ai > 0 and bi > 0
respectively. Therefore, r0 is the size of the minimal malicious
cut set of network T0, and ar0 is the number of minimal
malicious cut sets of network T0. Similarly, r1 is the size
9of the minimal malicious cut set of network T1, and br1 is
the number of minimal malicious cut sets of network T1. This
follows that
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1)
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0) =
∑n0
i=r0
ai ·
(
p
1−p
)
i∑n1
i=r1
bi ·
(
p
1−p
)
i
≈
ar0
(
p
1−p
)r0
br1
(
p
1−p
)r1 , (24)
where the first step is obtained from the fact that a1 = a2 =
...ar0−1 = 0, ar0 > 0, and b1 = b2 = ...br1−1 = 0, br1 >
0, and the second step is obtained by only keeping the first
item of both the numerator and denominator. Considering the
fact that when p is small, the probability that there are i + 1
malicious vehicle in the network is much smaller than the
probability that there are i malicious vehicles in the network,
therefore, this approximation is quite accurate.
Note that when p is small, we have p1−p  1. Therefore,
when r0 6= r1, whether the value of ar0(
p
1−p )
r0
br1(
p
1−p )
r1 shown as (24)
is larger than 1 is dominantly determined by the value of r0−
r1. Specifically, when r0 < r1, we have
(
p
1−p
)r0−r1  1. In
this case, the coefficient ar0br1 plays marginal role and therefore
ar0(
p
1−p )
r0
br1(
p
1−p )
r1 > 1; when r0 > r1, we have
(
p
1−p
)r0−r1  1,
and therefore
ar0(
p
1−p )
r0
br1(
p
1−p )
r1 < 1. On the contrary, when r0 = r1,
whether the value of
ar0(
p
1−p )
r0
br1(
p
1−p )
r1 is larger than 1 would heavily
depend on the value of the coefficient ar0br1 . Consequently, we
have
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1)
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0) ≈
ar0
(
p
1−p
)r0
br1
(
p
1−p
)r1

> 1, r0 < r1
< 1, r0 > r1
=
ar0
br1
, r0 = r1
,
(25)
which shows that to compare the values
of Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 1) and
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mk = mk|m0 = 0), we only need to
compare the values of r0 and r1, namely, the size of minimal
malicious cut set of network T0 and T1 when r0 6= r1, or
the value of ar0 and br1 , namely, the number of minimal
malicious cut sets of network T0 and T1 when they have the
same size of minimal malicious cut set.
From Menger’s Theorem [32], the size of the mini-
mal vertex-cut whose removal would disconnect two non-
adjacent vertices, is equal to the maximum number of vertex-
independent paths between these two non-adjacent vertices.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the size of minimal
malicious cut set of a network is also equal to the maximum
number of node-disjoint paths in the network between the
source vehicle and the destination vehicle. Therefore, r0 and
V1 
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V2 V3
S 
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(a) Network 1.
V1 V4
V2 V3
S DV5
V6
(b) Network 2.
Fig. 5. An illustration of two networks that have the same topology matrix.
r1 are also the numbers of maximum number of node-disjoint
paths exist in network T0 and T1 respectively. Note that
calculating the maximum number of vertex-disjoint paths from
source to destination is a special case of finding the maxi-
mum flow problem by setting every vertex capacity 1 [32].
Therefore, the values of r0 and r1 can be readily obtained by
existing maximum flow algorithms, e.g., introduced in [32]–
[34]. When r0 = r1, ar0 and br1 can be obtained by exhaustive
search algorithm according to their definitions given by (11)
and (14).
In summary, by combining (20) and (25), the decision rule
of our proposed heuristic algorithm can be shown as
d =
{
1, (r0 < r1) or (r0 = r1, ar0 > br1)
0, (r0 > r1) or (r0 = r1, ar0 < br1)
, (26)
and when r0 = r1, and ar0 = br1 , d is randomly chosen from
0 and 1 with equal probability.
Remark 6. It is worth noting that in the above analysis, the
network with a topology matrix B1 may not be unique. For
instance, a topology matrix B =
 1 1 1 1 0 01 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1
 can
correspond to both networks shown in Fig. 5. However, the
malicious cut sets of the networks with different topology
remain the same as there is a one-to-one correspondence
between each malicious cut set and a combination of columns
from the topology matrix that an element-wise union of them
resulting in a column with each entry being 1. That is, as long
as networks have the same topology matrix B, they would
have the same malicious cut sets. Therefore, the network T1
(or T0) corresponding to the same sub-matrix B1 (or B0) may
not unique, however it does not affect their malicious cut sets
analysis.
Remark 7. The implication of the heuristic decision algorithm
(26) can also be explained straightforwardly as follows. Given
two networks that deliver conflicting message contents, by
removing the common nodes shared by these two networks and
regarding each path after the removal of the common nodes
as a new complete path, there results in two new independent
networks that deliver conflicting message contents. Therefore,
decision can be made by comparing the robustness of the
two new networks. Note that a smaller size of the minimal
malicious cut set of a network implies a less number of
minimal malicious vehicles are required to compromise that
network, and consequently, a higher probability to deliver
incorrect messages. Therefore, the decision will always be
chosen as the message delivered by the network with a lower
probability to be compromised.
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From (26), we can see that the decision result is now entirely
determined by the network topology, and is independent of the
proportion of malicious vehicles in the network. That is, the
proposed heuristic decision algorithm is purely topology-based
so that is easy to be implemented in practice. In summary, the
heuristic decision algorithm works as detailed in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Heuristic Decision Algorithm
INPUT: M1...Mk
OUTPUT: d
begin
1) Construct topology matrix B based on the paths infor-
mation derived from the received k copies of message;
2) Based on the constructed topology matrix B, calculate
r0 and r1 based on maximum flow algorithm;
3) If r0 < r1 then d = 1
elseif r0 > r1 then d = 0
else calculate ar0 and br1 based on their definition
given by (11) and (14);
if ar0 > br1 then d = 1
elseif ar0 < br1 then d = 0
else d is randomly chosen from 0 and 1 with
equal probability
end
end
end
VI. SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we conduct simulations to establish the
validity of the decision algorithms proposed in Section IV
and Section V. We generate a network that vehicles are
Poissonly distributed in the road with density ρ, and each
relay vehicle has a probability p to be a malicious vehicle.
Vehicles communicate with their neighbors adopting the unit
disk model [23], [35] with transmission range r0 = 250m
[36]. We focus on a destination vehicle located at a distance L
from the source vehicle. From the time instant the destination
vehicle receives the first message reporting road condition,
it waits time period T to receive more number of messages
before it starts to make a decision. The per-hop transmission
delay is assumed to be β = 4ms [36]. For the road condition,
we choose a rather conservative probability of the occurrence
of an abnormal situation. Specifically, we set that an hazardous
road/environmental condition happens randomly with proba-
bility 0.001 [13], i.e., we set P1 = Pr(m0 = 1) = 0.001 and
P0 = 1− P1 = 0.999.
At each simulation, a topology matrix B can be constructed
based on the underlying network topology. Therefore, given
the malicious vehicle distribution and the topology informa-
tion, the content of the k messages M1,M2, ...Mk received by
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Fig. 6. A comparison of the probabilities of correct decision achieved by
the optimum decision algorithm proposed in Section IV, and by the heuristic
decision algorithm proposed in Section V.
the destination vehicle is determined. The destination vehicle
then makes a decision given the received messages and the
derived underlying topology information according to our
proposed decision algorithms at each simulation. The decision
result can be either correct or incorrect. The simulation is
repeated 5000 times and the proportion of the correct decision,
i.e., the probability of correct decision, is plotted.
In the following, we first compare our proposed two deci-
sion algorithms, and then we study the effects of topology in-
formation, and some performance-impacting parameters on the
algorithms. The performance-impacting parameters including
the proportion of malicious vehicle in the network, the choice
of waiting time by the destination vehicle before it starts to
make the decision..
A. Comparison of the two proposed algorithms
In this part, we compare the message security performance
achieved by the two proposed decision algorithms to provide
insight on the optimum decision algorithm design for secure
message dissemination.
Fig. 6 compares the probability of correct decision achieved
by the proposed optimum decision algorithm (labeled as Op-
timum Algorithm) and by the proposed pure topology-based
heuristic decision algorithm (labeled as Heuristic Algorithm)
respectively. It is shown that when the percentage of malicious
vehicles in the network is small, e.g., when p < 0.2 in
this case, the message security performance achieved by the
optimum decision algorithm is only slightly better than the
performance achieved by the heuristic decision algorithm. This
implies that the heuristic decision algorithm, that purely based
on network topology information and easily to be implemented
in practice, is sufficient to achieve a high message security
performance for vehicular networks.
B. Impact of topology information
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed algorithms
that takes the underlying topology information into consid-
eration, we compare the security performance, in terms of
the probability of correct decision made by the destination
vehicle, achieved by our proposed algorithms described by
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Fig. 7. A comparison of the probability of correct decision achieved assuming
our proposed algorithms and that achieved assuming other existing weighted
voting algorithms.
Algorithm 1 and 2 respectively, with that achieved by existing
weighted voting algorithms like the weighted voting algorithm
proposed in [29] (labeled with WV: MMSE) that considers
partial correlation between messages, the weighted voting
algorithm proposed in [14] (labeled with WV: w ∝ αh−1)
that does not consider the underlying topology information
causing the correlation between messages, and the major-
ity voting (a special case of weighted voting by assigning
identical weights to each vote) that totally ignores the un-
derlying topological correlation. Specifically, the weighted
voting algorithm proposed in [29] set weight to each message
as wi =
∑k
j=1 C
(−1)
ij
(∑k
r,j=1 C
(−1)
rj
)−1
, where C is the
error covariance matrix whose (i, j)th entry is defined by
the error covariance between message Mi and message Mj ,
calculated by Cij = E [(Mi −m0)(Mj −m0)]. C−1 is the
inverse matrix of the error covariance matrix C, and C(−1)ij
is the (i, j)th entry of the matrix C−1. The weighted voting
algorithm proposed in [14] simply assigns weight to each
message as wi = α
hi−1∑
j α
hj−1 , where α ∈ (0, 1) is a weighting
factor to reduce the oversampling impact caused by messages
generated from the same source and hi is the number of hops
travelled by the ith message from the source to the destination.
It can be seen in Fig. 7 that both our proposed algorithms
outperform the weighted voting algorithms proposed in [29],
[14] and the majority voting algorithm, which demonstrates
that our algorithms taking into account topology information
and correlation between different copies of message are able to
effectively improve the robustness of vehicle networks against
attacks from malicious vehicles.
C. Impact of the percentage of malicious vehicles
Fig. 7 reveals the relationship between the probability of
correct decision Psucc and the percentage of malicious vehicles
in the network, p. It can be seen that the probability of
correct decision made by the destination vehicle decreases
to its minimum value Psucc = 0 when the proportion of
malicious vehicles in the network is larger than a certain
threshold. Beyond that threshold, a further increase in p has
little impact on the security performance. Specifically, as
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Fig. 8. An illustration of the relationship between the probability of correct
decision and the waiting time period the destination vehicle waits before
it starts to make a final decision by adopting the proposed two algorithms
respectively.
shown in Fig. 7, when p is small, the security performance
achieved assuming the optimum decision algorithm decreases
with an increase of p; however, when p increases beyond a
certain threshold, a further increase in p has no impact on the
security performance. This can be explained by the fact that
the more malicious vehicles in the network, the more tampered
copies of message will be delivered, and therefore a lower
chance for the destination vehicle to make a correct decision
regardless of what algorithm it adopts. Furthermore, when the
number of malicious vehicles in the network reaches a certain
threshold, most of the message dissemination paths will be
compromised. In this case, the destination vehicle will totally
misguided by the incorrect messages and the message security
performance approaches its minimum value Psucc = 0.
D. Impact of the waiting time period
As mentioned in Section III-C, the waiting time period T
the destination vehicle waits before it starts to make a decision
is an important parameter that should balance the trade-off
between the response time requirement and the integrity of the
decision. Therefore, in this part, we study the impact of the
waiting time period T on the security performance assuming
the two proposed algorithms, under different traffic densities.
Fig. 8 demonstrates the relationship between the probability
of correct decision, Psucc, and the waiting time period T the
destination vehicle waits before it starts to make a decision,
assuming our two proposed algorithms respectively, and gives
insight into the choice of waiting time by the destination
vehicle. Importantly, we can see that for both algorithms, a
larger number of waiting time is beneficial to the secure mes-
sage dissemination because a longer waiting time potentially
implies a larger number of received messages. This conse-
quently, brings more information on the underlying network
topology, and therefore leads to a more robust result of the
data consistency check. However, when T increases beyond
a certain threshold Tth, e.g., in the case of ρ=0.01veh/m,
Tth = 100ms when adopting the proposed optimum decision
algorithm and Tth = 150ms when adopting the proposed
heuristic decision algorithm when, a further increase in T has
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marginal (less than 5%) impact on the probability of correct
decision. This is due to the fact that when T is larger than
a threshold, the marginal return brought by waiting a longer
time to the security performance is diminishing. Furthermore,
it can be seen that to achieve the same message security
performance, when the vehicular density is lower, the waiting
time needs to be longer. Therefore, when determining the
waiting time period, it is important to take the vehicular
density into account, e.g., in areas where the vehicular density
is large, the waiting time can be reduced. Thus, Fig. 8 exhibits
a guide on the choice of waiting time period for destination
vehicles.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed two decision algorithms that utilizes
the underlying network topology information to address the
issue of message inconsistency caused by malicious vehicles
that would tamper the content of disseminated messages. The
optimum decision algorithm proposed is able to maximally
help a destination vehicle make a correct decision on the
message content, based on the network topology information
and a prior knowledge of the percentage of malicious vehicles
in the network. The heuristic decision algorithm proposed
enables a vehicle to make a decision purely based on network
topology information, therefore is easier to implement in
practice. Simulations were conducted to verify the effective-
ness of the algorithms. We demonstrated that the heuristic
decision algorithm is able to achieve a security performance
close to that achieved by the optimum decision algorithm,
especially when the percentage of malicious vehicles in the
network is small. By comparing the two proposed algorithms
with existing algorithms that do not consider the underlying
topological information or only partially consider message
correlation, we showed that our proposed algorithms greatly
outperform existing ones. Moreover, we discussed the impact
of some key parameters on the performance of the proposed
algorithms, including the percentage of malicious vehicles in
the network, and the waiting time the destination vehicle waits
before making the final decision. Our results give insight on
the optimum decision algorithm design for vehicular networks
to improve message security.
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